READING HALLTHE DOORS OF WISDOM |
VICTORY OF THE PAPACYCHAPTER XX.HERESIES AND THE INQUISITION IN THE MIDDLE AGES
In the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries the Medieval Church was
at its greatest and most powerful; yet these centuries witnessed the appearance
of various heresies, which in certain parts of Europe were a serious menace to
the Church’s hold upon the people. While some of the heterodoxies of the period
were essentially philosophic and academic, others there were which made a wider
appeal direct to the masses; and while the former may have been potentially as
dangerous to the Church, it was the latter that inspired most apprehension and
that were consequently most vigorously repressed.
While less metaphysical than the
heresies of the early Church, those of the later Middle Ages had certain broad
characteristics in common with them. Thus the dualism
of the Cathari was Marcionite, the antisacerdotalism of many of the Waldenses was Donatist, the mystic enthusiasms of Ortlieb, Marguerite de la Porète,
and their followers was Gnostic, the ascetic zeal of the Fraticelli was
Montanist. This rather obvious parallelism constitutes one of the difficulties
in studying the later heresies, for it clouds the evidence. Thus, Catholic
writers, convinced that the Albigenses were Manichaeans, were content to go to
the works of St Augustine against the Manichaeans and to attribute
indiscriminately to the Albigenses all the errors enumerated in those pages.
Such a procedure, not necessarily adopted in any spirit of conscious
unfairness, was so obviously unscientific that it makes it difficult to use the
evidence of these writers with any confidence. In addition to this there is a
fundamental difficulty in dealing with any of the great popular heresies of
the Middle Ages in the fact that nearly all our knowledge of them is derived in
one way or another from their adversaries—either from the treatises of hostile
theologians or from confessions and depositions recorded in the archives of the
Inquisition. With the academic heretics it is quite a different matter. They
have left their own writings behind them, and we can come into direct contact
with their thought unclouded by the gloss of the hostile commentator.
The great popular heresies of the
Middle Ages constitute so remarkable a phenomenon that they call for a general
explanation. It is undoubtedly true that the popularity of heresy was due in
considerable measure to the Church’s failure to satisfy certain instincts and
aspirations in a period which was essentially restless and curious. The crude
violence of the time quickened Utopian visions, which were not only hopes of a
better future but criticisms of an evil present. A sense of disappointment, or
even of disillusion, is apparent after the failure of the earlier crusades.
Genuine spiritual fervour had been aroused, it seemed, to no purpose, and no
new stimulus to the spiritual imagination presented itself. The exalted
mysticism of a Hugh of St Victor or a Peter the Venerable possessed no popular
appeal, and it was not until the appearance of St Francis with his
extraordinary personal magnetism that the Church was able to provide a powerful
answer to the urgent demand for religious inspiration. The saint and the
ascetic invariably attracted veneration in the Middle Ages, when the ordinary
priesthood, if lacking in personal holiness, only elicited fear, indifference, or
dislike. There could be no more prolific encouragement to heresy than clerical
abuses. This was clearly the opinion of Innocent III, who, while seeking to
eradicate heresy in southern France, also delivered a tremendous indictment
against the conduct of the clergy there. St Dominic ascribed the success of the
Albigenses to what he regarded as their affectation of holiness and of
evangelical poverty which misled the people. And quite clearly the people of
Languedoc drew a forceful comparison, all to the advantage of the heretics,
between their zeal, simplicity, and austerity, and the wealth, ostentation, and
love of temporal power displayed by the accredited envoys of a God who had been
poor, humble, and despised. Anti-sacerdotalism is a marked feature, as it was
often a predisposing cause, of medieval heresy. Some of the heresies were to
begin with not doctrinal at all, but distinctively evangelical, arising from
dissatisfaction with existing conditions in the Church, and aiming at a higher
standard of faith and conduct.
For the forms which heresy assumed the
East was largely responsible. It is but a partial view of medieval history
which focuses attention solely upon the purely indigenous aspects of European
civilisation and fails to appreciate the force and the significance of the
impress upon Europe of the oriental world, the influence of the great
trade-routes into Asia as disseminators not only of wealth but of ideas. The
intercommunication, already fostered by the merchant and the traveller, was
quickened still further by the Crusades. The Christian warriors set forth vowed
to hold no other intercourse with the infidel but that of the sword. Yet the
later crusaders were not of the temper of those whom the eloquence of Urban II
and his coadjutors first enlisted, of those who had pursued their Muslim
enemies into the Temple itself with relentless slaughter when they captured the
Holy City. Frederick II’s crusade of 1229 was the expedition of a diplomatist,
not of a warrior, and it was characterised by the friendliness of its leader’s
relations with the Sultan of Egypt. To the vivid imagination of Frederick the culture of Baghdad made a powerful appeal; the
religion of Islam, the speculations of Arabian philosophers, were to him a
matter of intense intellectual curiosity, not of abhorrence; and an atmosphere
of rationalism prevailed at a court where Greek, Jew, or Arab were all alike
welcome. So it was that Gregory IX could with a certain plausibility assign to
his abhorred imperial enemy the authorship of the famous blasphemy, that the
world had been deceived by three impostors, Moses, Mahomet, Christ. Increasing
acquaintance with, and knowledge of, the religion of the Koran made possible at
any rate an elementary comparative study of religions, a realisation of their
common elements, and such a conception of religious toleration as we find
suggested in Boccaccio’s famous tale of The Three Kings, or in the
pseudo-gospel of Barnabas, a strange conglomeration of the Koran with the four
canonical gospels, the essential feature of which is a latitudinarian
conception that God’s message of salvation is for all. “As God liveth, even as the fire burneth dry things and converteth them into fire, making no
difference between olive and cypress and palm; even so our God hath mercy on every one that worketh righteously, making no difference
between Jew, Scythian, Greek, or Ishmaelite.” The possibility of an
unholy sympathy between the Christian and the infidel was the basic idea of the
dreadful allegations brought against the Templars, whatever their origin in
fact may have been. Among the indictments was the charge of practising a
ceremony of initiation which included the worship of a black cat, or Baphomet,
which is but another name for Mahomet. But it was not necessary to go outside
Europe to come into contact with oriental influences.
The East had penetrated into Europe; the culture of
the Caliphate had been planted in Andalusia, and mainly from Cordova and
Toledo its influence was disseminated abroad through Sicily and southern
France—its architecture, its medicine, its mathematics, its philosophy. Long
after the extinction of the glories of the Umayyad Caliphate of Cordova, the
splendour of Moorish learning remained, and in the twelfth century Muslim Spain
still eclipsed Catholic Europe in the arts and sciences. There was a certain
Moorish element in that brilliant exotic civilisation of Languedoc, where the
problem of heresy became most acute. In such a soil any hostility to the
Catholic Church, any dissatisfaction with its ministrations, was likely to
generate alien doctrine. The heresy of Languedoc was not Moorish, but it was
certainly of oriental origin, coming through the Balkans out of Asia.
In the days of the Carolingian Empire,
if we except the predestinarian opinions of Gottschalk and the pantheism of the
amazing Irish genius, John Scotus Eriugena, there was
little heresy of consequence. But it is clear that as a popular force it must have been quietly growing, probably among the common
people for the most part, before the opening of the eleventh century. It had
already become a serious danger before the Papacy,
immersed in other cares, had awakened to its gravity. It is significant that
certain heretics were condemned at Orleans, in 1017, for holding Docetic views,
and that these ideas were traced to Italy. We hear of tke execution of heretics in 1022 at Toulouse, in 1051 at Goslar
in Saxony. It is not
easy to establish the identity of these early heretics. Medieval chroniclers
are not exact in their nomenclature. We find a large variety of designations in
use. Thus the Cathari are variously known as
Albigenses, Albanenses, Bagnolenses, Bagnaroli, Bulgari, Publicani,
Patarini, Textores; the Waldenses as Humiliati, Pauperes de Lugduno, Leonistes. Thus the term Albigenses is used in Languedoc, the terms Patarini, Albanense, Concorricci in
Italy, textores and texerantes in Germany. But the words Bulgari or bougres are used indiscriminately in France to
mean heretics generally, though their derivation as indicating one particular type of heretic is obvious enough. The two
dominant heresies were Catharism and Waldensianism,
but a number of minor contemporary heterodoxies,
having some element or other in common with these, were apt to be closely
associated or confused with them, at all events in the popular mind. Thus the Arnoldists, following Arnold of Brescia, from being
originally simple opponents of the Pope’s temporal power in Rome, developed
into opponents of the secularism of the Church as a whole, and so came to have
much in common with the Waldenses. Again, the adherents of Peter de Bruys, whose teaching was that there was no efficacy in
images, the symbol of the Cross, or in paedobaptism, were liable to
identification with the Cathari, for these were also Catharan doctrines. Henry of Lausanne combined the principles of the Arnoldists and the Petrobrusians. The devastation wrought among the
faithful of southern France by this heresiarch was the despair of St Bernard at
a time when Catharism and Waldensianism were also
rampant in the same district. In short, all attacks upon the Catholic Church,
however different their origins and however discrepant their fundamental
theses, were likely to have a certain affinity and to give a very similar
impression to the ordinary undiscerning observer. Among other early
twelfth-century heretics were some who were zealots, either partly or wholly
insane. Such were Tanchelm of Antwerp, who, starting
with the Donatist theory that the sacraments had lost their efficacy owing to
clerical degeneracy, is said later to have claimed for himself a divine nature
equal with Christ’s; and lion de l’litoile, who,
discovering a reference to his own name in the words of Scripture, “Per Eum qui venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos,” declared himself to be the Son of God,
Donatism is perhaps the most notable
doctrinal feature of these essentially anti-hierarchical minor heresies. In
Catharism there is something much more revolutionary. The connexion between the
Cathari of Western Europe and the Bogomiles and
Paulicians of the Balkan peninsula can be said to have been established. The
use of the term Bulgar as synonymous with heretic in the common parlance of France is significant; so also is the fact that Bulgarian delegates attended a great
representative council of Cathari held in 1167 near Toulouse; and so again is
the close resemblance of the brief Albigensian ritual which has come down to
us, namely, the Ritual of Lyons, with that of the Bosnian Patarini,
and with the more elaborate manual of the Paulician Church in Armenia, known as The Key of Truth. Matthew Paris tells us of a complaint made in 1233 by
the papal legate Conrad, of the direct relations existing between the
Albigenses and the Armenian Paulicians, and Rainerius Saccho, a Catharan apostate, writing a little later, states that the Catharan churches in other parts of the world, were the offspring of a parent Church in
Bulgaria. The ancient, Paulicians of Armenia, holding themselves to be the one
true Church, were adoptionists—i.c. they considered that Christ had been born a man but, having fulfilled all righteousness, had at the time of his baptism in Jordan
been chosen by God as Messiah and as the eternal Son of God. They rejected
paedobaptism, the idea of purgatory, the invocation of saints, the use of
images, the doctrine of the Trinity. Between the eighth and tenth centuries
this Greek sect had crossed over in large numbers into Thrace. Leo the
Isaurian, and later Theodora, attempted their extirpation, but they were
protected by John Tzimisces, in whose reign some
hundred thousand of them migrated northward into the region of the Danube. Here
they seem to have attempted the conversion of the Bulgars, and here also the
pure doctrine of Paulicianism would appear to have become adulterated by an
infiltration of Manichaeism, or at all events of ideas of a gnostic and
dualist character; and hence arose the sect of the Bogomiles.
The connexion between the Paulicians and the western Cathari is clear; but it
is probable that the corrupted Paulicianism of the Bulgarians, rather than the
original Paulicianism of Armenia, was the origin of western Catharism, and
that, helped no doubt by the agencies of the scholar, the merchant, and the
crusader, the heresy travelled from Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Dalmatia into
Hungary and Italy. It found an easy settlement in Apulia and Lombardy, but an
even more favourable atmosphere in France, especially south of the Loire.
The new creed clearly possessed a
strong attraction for common people desirous of a novel spiritual stimulus, and
for a pleasure-loving nobility, such as existed notably in the south, who were
only too glad to seize an excuse for despoiling the wealthy Catholic hierarchy.
In the comforting rejection of the doctrine of purgatory, and the convenient
distinction drawn between the fully initiated and
the simple adherent, Catharism seemed to offer an easier road to salvation than
did the Catholic Church, while, at the same time, the zeal and energy of the
preachers of this gospel established factories and workshops, where
apprenticeship to craft or trade was combined with instruction in the Catharan faith. The fulminations of ecclesiastical councils
such as those of Toulouse in 1056 and 1119 were fruitless, and missionary
enterprises were no more successful. In 1165 Catholic clergy had to submit to
the humiliation of entering into a joint synod with
Albigensian representatives. The general Catharan congress of 1167, already mentioned, met undisturbed. Particularly during the
reign of William IX, Duke of Aquitaine, the heretics enjoyed full protection,
if not positive encouragement, from the secular authority.
To the faithful Catholic, Catharism no
doubt appeared to be a body of belief wholly foreign to Christianity, and in
the points of similarity between the Catharan ritual
and that of the Catholic Church he could discern nothing better than an impious
mockery. Nevertheless, in so far as its origin was Paulician, the story of this
heresy takes us back into that early era of Christianity prior to the definite
formulation of Catholic dogma and the full establishment of the great
organisation which we know as the Catholic Church, to the period when it was as
yet uncertain to what extent foreign, yet not wholly alien, systems, NeoPlatonic and Gnostic, might be assimilated to Christian
theology, and similarly uncertain how far the Church would be prepared to make
terms with the world, as represented by the Roman Empire. In this formative
period, when Christian doctors were seeking for philosophical explanations of
the Gospel revelation and of the relation of Christ to the Godhead, Marcion, in an endeavour to free Christian theology from
the taint of Judaism by a reaffirmation of what he conceived to be the message
of the Pauline epistles, issued a work called the Antithesis in which an
elaborate distinction was drawn between the God of the Old Testament, the God
of the Law, on the one hand, and on the other the God of the New Testament, the
God of reconciliation. While there is certainly enough dualism in St Paul to
warrant this line of argument, on the other hand the features of resemblance
between such an explanation of the Christian theophany and an entirely
non-Christian dualist system like the Mazdeist rendered possible such a hodge-podge of Marcionitism and Persian magism as
the mystic theology of Mani, and also rendered later
adherents of Marcionitism liable to corruption by nonChristian influences of that type. It is thus easy to
understand how any heresy which unduly stressed the dualist element in
Christian dogma was exposed to the imputation of Manichaeism. There were, no
doubt, wide theological divergencies between different branches of the Catharan community—some of them more akin to the original
Paulicians, others more tainted by Gnostic and exotic influences; yet to the
Catholic of the twelfth century all would appear one and the same, manifestly
Manichaean.
To the Catharan,
as to the Catholic, human existence was a struggle between the opposing forces
of good and evil, in which the person of Christ alone provided salvation, but
the Catharan laid excessive emphasis upon the
inherent evil of the material world. The several picturesque variants of the
fundamental Catharan conception are relatively unimportant;
what is essential is the idea of a contest between an evil potentate, who ruled
over the material universe, and who was sometimes identified with Jehovah, the
violent sanguinary deity of the Old Testament, and his adversary, the God of
the New Testament, the God of mercy and forgiveness, whose kingdom is not of
this world, but a wholly spiritual kingdom. While not entirely rejecting the
Old Testament—the Lyons ritual quotes the Book of Solomon—the Cathari
repudiated all portions of it which presented matter in a favourable light. The
whole purpose of earthly existence they held to be the overcoming of the evil
god or Satan. Inasmuch as the material world and the flesh were the dominion of
the Devil, nothing worse was imaginable, and there was therefore no hell or
purgatory. The object of Christ’s work was to reclaim the soul from the
thraldom of the flesh, and his servants were the Cathari, who alone had kept
the true baptism, which is of fire and of the spirit. There was no such thing
as the resurrection of the body. He that had become reconciled with God through
membership of the Catharan church was enabled at once
to leave his corporeal integument and enter into the
celestial body which awaited him in heaven. The soul of the unreconciled passed
into another material body, generally that of the animal to which in its human
existence it had borne the closest resemblance. The mortal sin was worldliness,
because it was devotion to those essentially transitory and evil things which
are Satan’s. This asceticism had one curious and extreme consequence. The chief
weapon in the Devil’s armoury was the propagation of the species, because that
meant the continuance of his power. Sex was his device. “O Lord,” runs the
Lyons ritual, “judge and condemn the sins of the. flesh, have no pity upon the
flesh born in corruption, but have pity on the spirit which is imprisoned.” The
love of the sexes, whatever its nature, had the same consequence and was
service of Satan. Marriage, was no better than
adultery and incest—indeed by some Cathari it was regarded as worse, being
lasting and viewed with complacency instead of temporary and viewed with shame.
Because of their belief in metempsychosis the Cathari were necessarily
vegetarians, abjuring all meats, eggs, cheese, and milk. They would use
nothing for food that was sexually begotten; the
exception made in favour of fish being due to the current belief that they were
generated in some other way. It is significant that a suspect summoned before
the Inquisition of Toulouse on a charge of Catharism vigorously protested against so unwarranted an imputation, seeing that he had a wife and children, ate meat, lied and swore, and was a faithful Christian.
So intense was their conviction of the
sanctity of the imprisoned human spirit that the Cathari showed with regard to the shedding of blood the same uncompromising
consistency as they did in the matter of sex, condemning both the judge who
pronounced sentence of death and the soldier who slew his enemy in battle as no
better than murderers. On the other hand, suicide—regarded as a legitimate
hastening of the time of his deliverance from the bondage of the flesh by the
fully initiated, and known as the Endura—would
appear to have been allowed, if not indeed encouraged. It has
to be remembered in partial explanation that the Endura was practised in days of relentless persecution, when voluntary
self-destruction might well seem preferable to falling into the hands of
ruthless crusader or inquisitor.
Austerity is the outstanding
characteristic of the Catharan existence, but then it
was practised only by the “perfected,” or boni homines, whose ranks were small. The severe
asceticism enjoined upon the perfected, the arduous nature of the period of
preparation, the menace of persecution, which rendered the postponement of
initiation to the last possible moment a measure of security—seeing that the
mere credens could lawfully disavow membership
of the community—all these factors combined to restrict the numbers of the perfected. The simple adherent or credens was not required necessarily to order his life on strict Catharan principles; he might even eat meat and marry. His sole obligation was to
venerate the “perfected.” In the reverence which had to be paid to the
initiated by the mere believers, or auditores, there is a point of resemblance to Manichaeism, as there is also in
certain features of the all-important Catharan rite,
the ritual of initiation, known as the Consolamentum. This was exceedingly simple, and in otheir features
is reminiscent of the primitive Church. It may be said to have
been a combination of the Christian baptism, ordination, eucharist and absolution, all in one. The Lord's Prayer was explained to the postulant,
sentence by sentence; he then renounced the works of Satan and the “harlot”
Catholic Church, made confession, and received pardon. One of the elders next
explained what the life of the bon chretien involved— the abjuration of the flesh in every way and of the shedding of blood,
the modelling of life onthe principle of turning the
other cheek to the smiter. The precise act of Consolamentum was the placing of the gospel and of the hands of the boni homines present upon the head of the novice, who
was thereby admitted into the ranks, in token whereof he was lastly girt with a
sacred thread round his naked body and invested with a black gown.
Catharism was clearly a strange
amalgam of asceticism and laxity, of some lofty ideals with aberrations which
were perverse and unhealthy. We cannot wonder that the Catholic, ever prone to
suspect the heretic of immoral practices, should do so with conviction in the
case of a sect whose
Although Bernard Gui brings charges of immorality against them, the purity of the lives of the
Waldenses was generally manifest. Even from inquisitorial sources testimony is
forthcoming to their simple piety and goodness, and it is noteworthy that
Walter Map, while repeating in lurid detail the usual stories of gross
immorality brought against the Albigenses—similar to those narrated by Caesarius of Haisterbach—speaks
with obvious respect of the Poor Men, with some of whom he came in contact at
Rome, being indeed deputed to examine them. He seems to have thought their zeal
rather ridiculous, but their austerity admirable.
The name Poor Men or Humiliati is also applied to a sect which seems to have had
a separate origin from the Poor Men of Lyons, but which in course of time came
to be identified with the followers of Waldo, and whose habitation was
Lombardy. The Humiliati of Provence and those
Alexander III’s approval at the same time; they in 1217, and there came to a
general agreement
Peter Waldo’s persuasion that the law
of Christ was nowhere obeyed and that radical
reformation was needed was shared by a remarkable contemporary, Joachim of
Flora, whose surprising expositions of Scripture and still more surprising
vaticinations introduce us to a series of heresies of a different character. In
1254 appeared the extraordinary work known as The Everlasting Gospel, consisting of Joachim’s authentic works together with exegetical notes and a
lengthy introduction, the author of which was either John of Parma, or, more
probably, Gerard da Borgo San Donnino—in either case
a Franciscan. The burden of Abbot Joachim’s prophetic message had been that
the world would pass through three eras—that of the Father or of the Law, that
of the Son or of the Crucifixion, that of the Holy Ghost or of Love. The first
had been a period of obedience; the second a period of study and wisdom; the
third would be one of mystic comprehension and ecstatic contemplation. But
while Joachim only claimed to be an interpreter of the Scriptures, the author
of the Introductorius discovered in this
conception a new evangel, as much in advance of the gospels as they were in
advance of the Old Testament, so that Joachim figured as the apostle of the
final era of human history. It was computed that the third cycle would commence
in the year 1260; it would be inaugurated by a new mendicant order. Clearly
the startling feature of the book was the assumption that the Christian
dispensation was not complete in itself, that a new
and a higher revelation of the Divine nature was necessary for the salvation of
the world. Such a theory rested upon a profound conviction of the corruption of
the time and the insufficiency of the Catholic Church. Like all Utopian visions
it was essentially a criticism of the existing order.
The revolutionary idea of a new
dispensation of the Holy Ghost
To the followers both of Segarelli and of Dolcino the term
Fraticelli is sometimes applied; it came indeed to be used to denote any
unauthorised or irregular brotherhood; for, as Salimbene tells us, “all who desired to found a new rule
borrowed something from the Franciscan rule, the sandals or the habit.” Thus a name derived from St Francis came to be associated
with many heretical sects. The author of the Introductorius ad Evangelium Eternum was certainly one of the Spiritual Franciscans,
those members of the Minorite order who would hear of no compromise with the
complete austerity of the founder’s system, and who saw in the possession of
property of any sort a repudiation of the essential
principles of their communion. To a minority consisting of intense enthusiasts,
who felt that the whole cause and life-work of St
Francis were betrayed by the worldly attitude of the conventual party on the
subject of Poverty, The Everlasting Gospel appeared as a direct
reference to themselves, the only true disciples of that saint, surely somewhat
more than man, upon whom the marks of Christ had been imprinted. When in course
of time the Papacy declared in favour of the moderate party, mystical and
exalted conceptions of the place of Francis in human history were encouraged,
and the man who, by enlisting his extraordinary spiritual power and attractiveness
on the side of the Church, did more than any other to save the medieval Church
against the assaults of heresy, became himself the inspiration of heresies of
a pantheist and “illuminist” character. The two principal leaders of the
Spirituals in France and in Italy, Pierre Jean Olivi,
a brilliant and a beautiful character, regarded by some as the successor of
Joachim and of Francis, and the Catalan Arnold of Villanova, denouncing the
worldliness of the clergy with as much energy and eloquence as any Waldensian, became suspect of heresy,
and after their deaths their followers were vigorously persecuted in the
pontificate of John XXII, in whose days the Spirituals generally were in frank
revolt, and they were dealt with as manifest heretics. The poet Jacopone da Todi delighted to draw a glaring contrast between the corrupt and carnal Church presided over by the
Popes and the true spiritual Church, wed to the principle of poverty, between a
Church of mere outward show and one of inward reality.
There were mystics, to whom the term
Fraticelli is applied, much more extreme in their views than the Spiritual
Franciscans. Whether Francis' own conception of the worship of God
in nature was more than lyrical or not, it contained at all events a suggestion
of pantheism, and some of the independent communities which adopted one feature
or another of the Minorite rule, even if only the outward semblance, were
certainly pantheists. In the thirteenth century, inspired by the mendicant
idea, there sprang up a number of brotherhoods devoted
to religious contemplation and to such good works as the care of the sick and
attendance on the dead. While these voluntary associations had no necessary
connexion with the Grey Friars, beyond perhaps spiritual sympathy, they came to
be regarded as Fraticelli. To such brotherhoods or sisterhoods the words Beghards and Beguines are sometimes applied. The term beguinage is older than the mendicant orders. Pious
associations of laymen under that name had existed in the twelfth century,
enjoying virtually complete autonomy until the inauguration of Innocent III’s
movement of centralisation. Large permanent houses, named beguinages,
were established in such cities as Paris, Cologne, and Ghent for the protection
of widows and orphans. Such houses could be controlled by proper authority, but
it was otherwise with the later vagrant associations of beghards or beguines. Over these it was not possible to maintain discipline; neithei’ could their intellectual atmosphere be controlled,
and irregular views were apt to flourish in associations which were
unauthorised. The medieval vagrant had ever a tendency to become a rebel
against authority, as well doctrinal as political; witness the wandering students
of the Carmina Burana.
Two tendencies developed in the
fourteenth century. Heretics of illuminist and pantheist views took to wearing
the beghard’s garb; beghards adopted illuminist and pantheist doctrines. Among them were the so-called
Brethren of the Free Spirit, the disciples of Ortlieb of Strasbourg, who taught that men must be guided solely by the inner light
within them. The Brethren held that all sacred history was but the record of
their communion. Adam had founded it, Noah had built his ark expressly to
preserve it, and after a period of obscurity Christ had re-established it. The
sect were sometimes called Luciferans,
because they held that Satan was included in the Divine essence. Holding such a
theory as this, they were perhaps inevitably—though probably with no
justification—credited with devil-worship and the perpetration of horrid
obscenities at the ceremony of initiation into their confraternity. Pantheism
and antinonmanism are often allied. Another of the
medieval pantheists, Marguerite de la Porète, held
that the soul overwhelmed in love of its creator can and indeed ought to give
to nature whatsoever it craves for or desires without
the rebuke of conscience or remorse.
The illuminist movement was particularly strong in Germany, where the great
Dominican, Master Eckehart—predecessor of Tauler, Nicholas of Cusa, and Giordano Bruno in the history of modern mysticism—explained that in the eyes of
the Deity sin and virtue were alike. Thus mysticism, normally one of the most
powerful forces of which the Church was possessed, its greatest security
against the onslaughts of the heterodox, was capable of itself assuming a
heretical shape: in the same way that the perfectly orthodox belief in the
efficacy of the scourge as a means and an outward sign of repentance could
degenerate into a depraved and animal delight in self-torture, combined with a
mystic and wholly unlawful belief that flagellation was not only a sacrament
but the only effective sacrament. Bands of flagellants, who when they first
made their appearance about 1260 were regarded with
ecclesiastical approval and popular veneration, in the following century were
anathematised as manifest heretics.
Alike in their extravagant and often
fanatical mysticism, all the sectaries to whom the term Fraticelli was applied and other similar mendicant associations were alike
also in their vagrancy. Sooner or later such roamers in the Middle Ages were
apt to become suspect, to be regarded as undesirables; perhaps their unchartered
liberty was productive of wild and ecstatic speculations which authority could
but regard as dangerous to the faith and to the constitution of the world
order.
While Catharism and Waldensianism were essentially popular creeds, whose chief
importance lay in their anti-sacerdotalism, the interest of the illuminist
heresies lies largely in their philosophic aspect. It is here, in their
possession of a common mystical element, that the popular and academic heresies
meet. The record of the latter belongs most appropriately to that of the
anti-scholastic movements in the history of medieval thought; but at the same time they cannot be omitted from any general consideration
of medieval heresy. Philosophy and theology have a natural inclination to
invade each other’s territories, and while the scholastic philosophers
endeavoured to keep them apart, being aided in this by the largely formal
pattern of their dialectic, still there arose from time to
time venturesome spirits whose philosophic speculations ran counter to
correct theology. Hugh of St Victor and, later, Abelard’s pupil Peter Lombard were able with great success to utilise philosophy as the
handmaid of religion, to glorify God by the rational justification of faith;
Anselm, requested by his pupils for a rational explanation of Christian
doctrine, duly gave one, premising however that while the Catholic faith could
be made clear to the eye of the intellect, it was not dependent upon its
reasonableness for its claim to acceptance. On the other hand, Abelard, also
endeavouring to use philosophy as a theodicaea, exposed himself to the suspicion of heresy. Combating the tritheism of Roscellinus, he seemed to some of his critics to run into
the opposite error of Sabellianism. But it was his whole habit of thought that
was wrong in their eyes. He could deliberately make a jumble of
the contradictions of the Fathers—as he did in Sic et Non—in a way most
disturbing to a simple belief in tiieir uniform
inspiration. His cast of mind was that of the
free-thinker. The basis of his reasoning was the conviction that it is by
doubting that we are led to inquiry, by inquiry that we perceive the truth.
Such a point of view was an abomination to St Bernard with his magnificent
affirmation: “Faith is not an opinion, but a certitude.” When the appeal to
the reason, even for the elucidation of truth, led to a deification of man’s
finite understanding, devout minds, such as those of Bernard and Peter Bamiani, could find in philosophy only an enemy of the faith.
He who uses the eye of the intellect overmuch may overcloud the far keener
vision of his spiritual sensitiveness; his preference for the former is no
better than profane arrogance. It is precisely this attitude, the inclination
to trust to the fallible judgment of the individual, in a word self-will, that
constituted in the eyes of the pious Catholic of the Middle Ages the
heinousness of heresy.
Just as Eriugena,
who had pronounced the superiority of reason over authority, had proved that
this was the path of error by himself falling into pantheism, so Berengar of
Tours, a reckless dialectician like Abelard, in the eleventh century found that
his reason could not accept the doctrine of Transubstantiation, on the ground
that the continuance of such properties as colour, form, and taste in the bread
and wine after the consecration could not exist without permanence of
substance. So again the reliance of Roscellinus upon fallible reason led to his rejection of
the doctrine of the Trinity—there was not one God, but three Gods, sharing,
however, a common will and purpose. Philosophy, then, was not always the
handmaiden of true religion!
The thirteenth century witnessed a
revival of interest in the earlier pantheists, and Eriugena’s De Division Naturae was resurrected. Already Amaury of Bène had been propounding the thesis that
all things are one, because whatever is is God, that
God is immanent in all creation. He had also been maintaining the antinomian
principle that no man filled with the Holy Ghost can sin, because sin is of the
flesh, whereas the Holy Ghost is spirit. These opinions Amaury retracted before
his death c. 1207; they were formally condemned by a council of the
ecclesiastical province of Sens held at Paris in 1210. This same council, it is
interesting to note, at the same time prohibited the use of the recently
discovered works of Aristotle or of his commentators on pain of excommunication.. The capture of Constantinople in 1204 had
brought Latin Europe more closely into contact with Greek thought than
heretofore; still Western Europe knew Aristotle best in the Arabic version and
in the expositions of his Saracen interpreters, especially Averroes. Probably the Averroists were never very numerous or widely influential; yet in the thirteenth century
they presented to the Church a problem of no little intricacy, raising in an
acute degree the question of the relations between philosophy and theology.
Catholic theology had been able to make abundant use of Plato from the earliest
days of the Church onwards; the medieval discovery of Aristotle brought the
query how far it could go in absorbing the peripatetic philosophy too. The newly-discovered writings on the physical sciences contained
conceptions of the eternity of matter and the unity of the intellect, which
made God only the primordial element in creation and denied the immortality of
the individual soul. It soon became apparent that intellectual curiosity was
too keen to be repressed by such a prohibition as that of the council of 1210.
It became obvious that Aristotle must not be tabooed, but turned to account. Gregory IX, accordingly, ordered the examination and
expurgation of the peripatetic philosophy, and in 1255 the two prohibited
books, the Physics and the Metaphysics., were definitely prescribed for the Arts course of the University of Paris. In
1261 Thomas Aquinas and William of Moerbeke, under
papal commission, commenced the great undertaking, which lasted eight years, of
making a translation and a commentary upon Aristotle. This labour exposed St
Thomas to criticism from two opposed quarters: on the one hand he was accused
(by the Franciscans) of being an Averroist, on the
other of misinterpreting Aristotle because he was not one. The Dominicans as a whole were accused by their Minorite rivals of being
too purely scientific and intellectualist, but the attempt to discredit Aquinas
by identifying him with the Averroists, whose
interpretation of Aristotle was definitely declared heretical, completely
failed, and the successful separation of Aristotle from Averroes, the capture
of the Aristotelian scientific method for the service of orthodoxy, must be
accounted one of the greatest achievements of the scholastics.
The view that Albertus Magnus and
Aquinas, in seeking to reconcile the wisdom of Aristotle with revealed
religion, were simply perverting their original was championed in the
University of Paris, the centre of all these academic contentions, by a certain Siger of Brabant and his associate Boethius of Dacia.
Averroes, while honouring religion, had poured contempt on theology. Religion was a genuine thing, a matter for the soul and for
the emotions; theology was a hybrid, endeavouring with lamentably poor results
to apply the methods of exact science to the sphere of the spiritual
imagination. Aristotle, the supreme thinker of all time, had taught the
eternity of matter and the unity of the intellect; there could be no
equivocation about these principles—they were true. They were contrary to Christian
truth, was the orthodox retort, and in 1270 Stephen Tempier,
Bishop of Paris, solemnly condemned thirteen Averroist propositions as erroneous. Undismayed, the
Parisian Averroists, having come into conflict with
the rector of the university, organised
themselves into a separate community
apart from the rest of the Arts faculty. But in 1277, under papal injunction to
search out dangerous errors in doctrine, Tempier tabulated no fewer than 219, and pronounced the penalty of excommunication
against those who harboured any of these heresies. Shortly afterwards Siger and Boethius were cited to appear before the
Inquisitor of France, from whom they apparently appealed on the ground of their
university privilege. Later they seem to have set off for Rome to defend
themselves, to have been tried before the Tuscan Inquisition, and to have been
condemned to perpetual imprisonment. The nature of their defence
against the charge of heresy is interesting, because it was a pure
equivocation. There is, they declared, such a thing as a double truth. What is
true in philosophy may not be true in theology and vice versa; they exist on
entirely different planes. They had no quarrel with the Church’s teaching, no
desire to impugn its authority, to embarrass its ministers; on the other hand,
they were not prepared to abandon, as philosophers, theories of whose truth
they were convinced, simply because they clashed with current theology. They
stood in reality for the cause of intellectual
freedom, seeking to escape from the embarrassments of a world unable to accept
that principle by a subterfuge which they hoped might satisfy the scruples of
the Church. For the Church was not hostile to speculative thought as such, but
only stipulated that it should be shewn not to be opposed to the essential
tenets of the Christian faith.
But in refusing to countenance the Averroist contention the Church stood on firm ground. The
denial of absolute truth, of any correspondence between the concepts of
philosophy and of theology, either meant that philosophy was reduced to a mere
mental gymnastic, or else was a fundamental cynicism.
A man’s sincere belief regarding ultimate reality constitutes his religion and
is bound to affect his conduct. Acceptance of the Aristotelian theory of matter
and of the active and passive intellect was bound to colour a man’s ethical
ideas as well. It is notable, for example, that the Averroist Farinata degli Uberti was
also an Epicurean, holding that the soul perishes with the body and that human
felicity is confined to this temporal world.
Despite the fate of Siger, Averroism still continued to exist throughout the fourteenth century, its most outstanding exponent in
Paris being John of Jandun; but its most important
centre became Padua, where the leader was Peter of Abano.
As a rule the Averroist was
unpopular, some like Raymond Lull seeing in him a dangerous corrupter of
Christian truth by Muslim impurities, others like Petrarch and Gerson hating
him for his self-confident dogmatism. Like the Italian humanist after him, the Averroist seldom fell into serious trouble; he had not
the slightest desire to apostatise or to criticise the Church in any way; he
would cheerfully subscribe to each and every article in all the creeds; his
interests and his influence were confined to the class-room. Thus he was seldom regarded as dangerous, though the
whole tenour of his teaching might inherently be as
destructive of orthodox doctrine as that of the most fanatical Albigensian or Fraticello.
Heresy was defined by Grosseteste as
“an opinion chosen by human sense, contrary to Holy Scripture, openly taught,
pertinaciously defended.” There was never any doubt in the medieval Church as
to its culpability; but there was at first difference of opinion as to its
appropriate punishment. The early fathers could be quoted, some in favour of
leniency, others of severity. The Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian II had
decreed exile and confiscation of property with loss of civil rights for
heretics generally, but death for disturbers of the public peace, under which
designation Donatists and Manichaeans were included. It is noteworthy that,
when Priscillian was executed by the Emperor Maximus,
St Leo, though declaring that the Church must never put a heretic to death,
still confessed that the severity of Christian princes was to be welcomed,
because the fear of punishment won some heretics back to the faith. The
Church’s own penances at this time were those of
flogging and imprisonment.
At the opening of the eleventh century we find the secular arm meting out the punishment of
death. In 1022 in the presence of Robert II of France thirteen Cathari were
burnt at Orleans; in 1051 other Cathari were hanged in the presence of the
Emperor Henry III at Goslar. Neither in France nor in the Empire was there a
secular law prescribing the death penalty for heresy, but the executions
evidently had public approval. Sometimes indeed the people acted on their own
authority. There are cases of this in 1076 at Cambrai, in 1114 in the diocese
of Strasbourg, in 1144 at Liege, in 1163 at Cologne. In one instance we are
told that the crowd burnt the heretics through fear of clerical leniency.
Clearly the greatest zeal against heretics in this period came from the
populace; clearly also they were persuaded that the stake was the appropriate
retribution. Ecclesiastical councils of this century, while adjuring the
secular authority to apprehend heretics, speak only of excommunication as their
punishment. As to the desirability of the Church’s handing over heretics to the
State for drastic treatment, opinions differed. Wazo,
Bishop of Liege (1042-48), disapproved of this, his successor Theoduin favoured it. St Bernard preferred the method of
persuasion to coercion, yet ominously quoted with reference to heretics the
words of St Paul, “For he beareth not the sword in vain.” In 1157 a council at Rheims, in calling upon the
secular arm to award life-imprisonment to Cathari, seems also to hint at the
punishment of death in the vague phrase, “nisi gravius aliquid fieri debet visum.” Hugh, Bishop of
Auxerre (1183-1206), took upon himself the task of expelling or
burning heretics as seemed best in particular cases, and about the same time the Archbishop
of Rheims co-operated with the Count of Flanders in stamping out heresy in his
diocese by means of the stake. Clearly during the twelfth century there was a
tendency towards increasing severity in the Church’s attitude.
The evolution of the Canon Law is
largely the explanation. In a treatise possibly by Ivo of Chartres, De edicto imperatorum in damnatione hacreticorum, part of a law of Justinian meting out death to the Manichaeans is incorporated.
At this time the Cathari were universally regarded as Manichaeans. Although the Decretum of Gratian does not mention
the death penalty for heretics, certain of his commentators state that impenitent heretics may bo put to death.
The earliest secular law in the Middle Ages relating to heresy is the Assize of Clarendon, which orders that any house in which heretics have been harboured is to be
destroyed. Shortly before this two Cathari brought before Henry II at Oxford
had been whipped, branded, and banished. In 1184 Pope Lucius III and Frederick
Barbarossa had a momentous meeting at Verona, at which it was arranged, on the
one hand, that bishops should make diligent inquiry for heretics and
excommunicate the obdurate, while, on the other hand, the secular authority
should enforce the penalties of the imperial ban, namely, exile, infamy, the
demolition of tainted houses, the confiscation of property. In 1194 the Emperor
Henry VI reissued these instructions, adding the penalty of a fine on any
individual or community neglecting opportunities for the apprehension of
heretics. The first undoubted instance of the death penalty occurring in
medieval secular legislation against heresy appears in an edict of Peter II of
Aragon in 1197, prescribing banishment for all heretics, but the
stake for any that might remain in defiance of the edict. This legislation is
important, but it relates only to Aragon and the death penalty is only contingent.
At the best, the measures taken
against heretics up to the close of the twelfth century had been half-hearted
and spasmodic. It does not appear that the decrees of Verona had been
effectively carried out. Emperors and Popes had been in the main so much
absorbed in their quarrels that they had not given serious attention to the
problem of heresy. Then in 1198 came the accession to the papal throne of
Innocent III, at once a lawyer and a man of action. In the first capacity, in a
letter addressed to the magistrates of Viterbo, he
propounded a most important analogy between heresy and treason, for which the
just requital was death. Though he did not here draw the conclusion, the
logical outcome of the argument is that treason to Jesus Christ is worthy at least
of death. Innocent was much perturbed by heresy in certain
Italian cities—Viterbo itself, Orvieto, Verona. But
even worse was the open prosperity of Catharism in the lands of Raymond VI of
Toulouse. It was a challenge to the new Pope’s masterful spirit. His first
remedy was the sending of special missionaries, armed with legatine powers.
Their total failure and the murder of one of them, Peter de Castelnau, were the
signals for the adoption of his second remedy—the crusade. The Albigensian wars
are the most notorious example of sustained and successful persecution in
history.
But they represent only the first stage in suppression. Catharism was rooted
out because they were followed up by the unremitting labour of inquisitors for
generations after. To the method of indiscriminate slaughter succeeded
procedure by means of an efficient tribunal, specially fitted for the task.
Though the Inquisition may be said to
have started soon after the Albigensian wars, it did not arise directly out of
them; its origin takes us further back. Heresy, being essentially a spiritual
offence, had always come within the purview of every diocesan, like any other
ecclesiastical offence. But heresy cases became in the eleventh and early
twelfth centuries so numerous that it proved impossible for the bishops to
deal adequately with them and at the same time carry on their multifarious
other duties with efficiency. When experience shewed this to be undeniably the
case, a special new. machinery was created—a court existing expressly for the
trial of heresy cases, namely, the Inquisition. This process would have taken
place even had there never been any Albigensian crusades.
The peculiar features of inquisitorial
procedure arose largely from the difficulty experienced in a heretic-infested
country in securing evidence. The ordinary methods of initiating a prosecution
in a spiritual court, just as in a civil court, were those of denuntiatio and accusatio. By the former the archdeacon introduced a case from his own personal knowledge;
by the latter proceedings were taken upon evidence proffered by an individual
informer. The archdeacon having many other duties to attend to, the Church had
in the main to rely upon the second method. But when heresy was popular and
protected by those in high places, it was not easy to induce private persons to
play the part of delator. The Council
of Verona (1184) suggested another system. It directed that
bishops should make periodical circuits of their dioceses with the
express purpose of inquiring into, of ferreting out, heresy; that they should
compel trustworthy persons to denounce all those whose manner of life differed
from that of good Catholics, and that they should take judicial action based
upon the common report or difiamatio of the
locality obtained in this manner. The system thus mapped out is an
inquisitorial system. It is a supplement to the usual methods of originating a
judicial action, intended to surmount the particular
difficulty of securing evidence in cases of heresy. But there is as yet no suggestion of the setting up of a new tribunal.
Cases of heresy are still tried by the bishop in the ordinary episcopal court.
The Councils of Avignon (1209) and
Montpellier and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) recommended the same
procedure. It was not found to be sufficiently effective, and in 1227 the
Council of Narbonne endeavoured to improve upon it by the device of entrusting
certain persons described as testes synodales with the duty of making diligent inquiry concerning the heretics of their
several neighbourhoods. These synodal witnesses—though the term is new—may be
merely the trustworthy persons referred to by the earlier Councils, but in any case they are now allotted a new task. They have
not merely to denounce, they have to search out. In
the literal sense of the word these witnesses are local inquisitors. In the creation
of an organised system of delation one characteristic
feature of inquisitorial practice has now been evolved, although the tribunal
known as the Holy Office has not yet come into existence.
But the new devices of collecting together the material for the creation of a diffamatio and of launching judicial proceedings for
heresy upon a diffamatio still left the
machinery of persecution inadequate. Experience seemed to show that there was
something inherently defective for the trial of heretics in the existing
spiritual courts, and that it was desirable to entrust both the process of
thoroughly organising the search for heretics and that of actually
trying them to experts specifically appointed and exclusively employed
in that work. Delegates expressly nominated by the Pope to combat heresy,
entrusted with special powers and more or less independent of ordinary episcopal authority, there had already been—such, for example, as
Peter de Castelnau, Arnold of Citeaux, and St Dominic himself. Dominic has
indeed been hailed as the first inquisitor, though the Inquisition properly
speaking was not founded till ten years after his death. But neither in the
wider sense of a simple investigator nor in the more technical sense of a judge in cases of heresy is it true that St Dominic was a
pioneer. In the wider sense all the envoys employed to combat the errors of the
Albigenses and to bring the culprits to justice may be called inquisitors. The
conversion of the haphazard and occasional papal delegation in matters of
heresy into a properly organised and permanent system was the work of Gregory
IX, who may therefore be legitimately accounted the founder of the tribunal of
the Inquisition. He was responsible for the institution of the permanent
judge-delegate for heretical causes, who, at first acting as advisory colleague
to the bishop, in course of time came to oust the bishop from effective control
in these cases.
The first and perhaps the most
notorious delegate selected by Gregory IX was Conrad of Marburg, the brutal torturer of St Elizabeth of Hungary, who harried the
heretics of Germany with the utmost vigour. Another was Robert le Bougre, an apostate Catharan,
appointed Inquisitor of France in 1235.
But, generally speaking, the Pope found that members
of the two great Mendicant Orders were best fitted for his purpose. Both had
already rendered most zealous and conspicuous service in combating heresy; they
were, moreover, bound by peculiar ties to the Holy See and could therefore be
appropriately used for work which to a large extent must involve the
supersession of ordinary episcopal authority. Accordingly from the outset there was a close association between the Friars and the
Inquisition. The inauguration of the new system may be taken as dating from
April 1233 when Gregory addressed two bulls, the first to the bishops, the
second to the Dominicans, of southern France. In the first he refers to the
bishops as being “engrossed in a whirlwind of cares, scarce able to breathe in
the pressure of overwhelming anxieties.” Their burdens must be eased, and he
has therefore decided to help them by sending the Preaching Friars against the
heretics of France. He therefore orders the bishops, as they reverence the Holy
See, to receive the friars kindly, to treat them well, and to give them all
possible assistance in the fulfilment of their office. In the second bull the
friars are empowered to proceed against all, laymen and clerks, without appeal,
calling in the aid of the secular arm when necessary and coercing opposition,
if need be, by the censures of the Church. It is possibly true that in
publishing these bulls Gregory did not intend to create a new tribunal, that he
did not envisage the matured system which was undoubtedly the direct
consequence of his action; it is also unquestionably true that he did not
contemplate relieving the bishops of their existing authority in cases of
heresy—indeed next year he is found angrily threatening the bishops of the
province of Narbonne with his serious displeasure if they do not show greater
energy against the heretics. But whatever may have been Gregory’s ultimate
intentions, certain it is that the bulls of 1233 were decisive in virtually
inaugurating the career of the Holy Office. In the subsequent development of
its organisation and procedure the greatest part was taken by Innocent IV,
Alexander IV, Urban IV, Clement IV, Clement V, and John XXII, aided by the
rules of a number of ecclesiastical councils, from
that of Beziers in 1233 to that of Albi in 1254.
To begin with, the friars-inquisitors
were itinerant, just as their predecessors had been, but gradually, as the
advantages of regularly employing the Mendicants in the war against heresy
became more and more obvious, the practice was evolved of partitioning different
countries and districts between them, and so of instituting permanent local
tribunals, Thus in the West, Provence, Dauphiné, and Savoy were allotted to the
Franciscans; northern France, Lorraine, and Flanders to the Dominicans. Germany
became a Dominican sphere; Bohemia and Dalmatia
Franciscan. In theory the inquisitors continued to co-operate with the
bishops—in the middle of the thirteenth century Innocent IV still regards the
bishops as the judges, the friars only as expert assistants; but as time went
on and heresy was recognised as being a constant, not merely a passing, menace,
and as the inquisitor became more and more experienced, more and more skilled,
so the presence of the inquisitor in any heresy trial became indispensable,
that of the diocesan purely formal and perfunctory. There is abundant evidence
of much episcopal jealousy and of a good deal of friction between bishop and
inquisitor, which, in view of the special privileges and immunities of the
latter, is not surprising. Released from obedience to provincials and generals,
inquisitors could not be interfered with even by papal legates. At first their
commissions were regarded as expiring with the life of the Popes who issued
them; from 1267, however, they were regarded as being continuously valid. While
some medieval inquisitors were looked upon as wantonly cruel even by their
contemporaries and appear to a more liberally-minded age as monsters, as a whole they were picked men, and high qualities of
courage, probity, zeal, and sagacity were repeatedly demanded by the Popes.
Bernard Gui’s description of the model inquisitor is
a very fine one, even according to modern standards.
In addition to bishop and inquisitor
there were present at all heresy trials the notary and certain councillors,
known as viri boni or viri periti. The
notary was an official of importance, as all the proceedings of the court were
minutely recorded. It often happened that evidence which was irrelevant and unimportant, so far as concerned the case actually
being tried, proved to be of the utmost value in some other case, perhaps in a
different country and many years later. The sinister and dreadful reputation
that the tribunal acquired, the impression of its inexorable, unescapable
power, was due largely to the fact that it was secret and ubiquitous, but also
in no small measure to the fact that its records were exact and elaborate. The
viris periti might be either clerks or laymen; quite frequently they were civil lawyers. There might be as many as twenty or
thirty of these councillors present at a trial. The inquisitor was under no
obligation to accept their advice, and often no doubt their presence was merely
formal; the fact remains that the system did provide these assessors—a sort of
consultant jury—often consisting of expert civil lawyers, who kept a watch upon
the proceedings and wereat least a potential check
upon arbitrary action. Others who accompanied the inquisitor and might be
present in the tribunal were the inquisitor’s vicar or lieutenant, who
sometimes acted as his deputy and customarily assisted in the examination of
witnesses, and the inquisitor’s socius, who appears to have had no
official functions, but only the social duty of attending upon the inquisitor
on his journeys. More important were the familiars, a band of petty officials,
ever tending to become more numerous, who acted as a personal body-guard for the inquisitor, visited prisons, officiated
at autos-da-fe, and. often played the part of special agents and spies.
Casuistry tended to flourish in a
tribunal existing for the trial of an offence which was specifically in intellectu, a matter of wrong thinking and believing,
not necessarily revealed by any overt act. The manuals of inquisitors abound in
nice and subtle distinctions, such as were apt to be produced by an attempt to
deal consistently and scientifically with an offence by its very nature
complex. A careful classification was made of various types of heretic. Affirmative were those who openly avowed
their errors, negative those who denied or prevaricated; perfected heretics were those who not only held erroneous opinion but modelled their
lives in accordance with it, imperfect those who simply held the opinion
but did not conform their behaviour to it. In addition to undoubted heretics
the court took cognisance of those who had in greater or less degree exposed
themselves to suspicion of heresy. Thus, to have saluted a heretic or
listened to his discourse on a single occasion was to become lightly suspect; to have done so twice or thrice to become vehemently suspect;
to have done so often to become violently suspect. The idea was that for
a good Catholic to have acted in such a way as to have incurred the bare
suspicion of heretical contamination was in itself a misdemeanour, for which penance must be imposed. Fautorship or the defence of heretics, either in the shape of positive aid or even the
most trivial kindness or courtesy or in the shape of neglect to bring them to
justice when opportunity offered, was a more serious offence. Sometimes a crime
which was not primarily one of heresy was dealt with by the Inquisition,
because it resulted from some erroneous belief. Usury, adultery, clerical
concubinage did not come under inquisitorial cognisance as such; only if the
guilty persons committed those offences with the heretical opinion that they
were not sinful. In the fifteenth century much of the tribunal's attention was
occupied by cases of sorcery and witchcraft. Alexander IV had exhorted
inquisitors not to be deflected from their proper work by such cases; but
Bernard of Como in 1250 championed the view that the magic arts were a form of
heresy, and this interpretation easily prevailed.
The commencement of inquisitorial
proceedings was preceded by the announcement of a time of grace, and a promise
of mild treatment for those who voluntarily surrendered themselves before its
expiration, and the promulgation of an edict of faith, calling upon good
Catholics to denounce the guilty. The actual trial resolved itself largely into
a prolonged interrogatory of the accused either by the inquisitor himself or
his vicar. If the accused did not at once make confession and throw himself
upon the mercy of the court, he had to try to explain away the diffamatio against him. This was no easy
matter. To invalidate the diffamatio it was
necessary to prove that the witnesses were actuated by mortal enmity, for it
was assumed that no motive less strong could induce any one to launch so
terrible a false accusation. As the accused was never confronted with the
witnesses, and was never informed who had defamed him, all he could do was to
give a list by guess-work of his possible enemies.
These disabilities to the defence existed for the protection of informers
against the chance of vengeance. The Inquisition was quite indiscriminate in
its 46 acceptance of evidence, readily accepting the
depositions of one heretic against another (though never in his favour), of
husband against wife, of child against parent, of servant against master. Even
the evidence of murderers, proved perjurers, and excommunicates was not
excluded. At first this type of evidence had not been allowed, but in 1261
Alexander IV declared it to be valid in heretical causes. The interrogatory
based on such testimony was apt to be long, baffling, and involved. Seeing that
heretics were credited with great acuteness, begotten of the evil one, it was
held to be perfectly legitimate to harass the accused with the most intricate
and disconcerting examination. The inquisitor, piously regarding himself as engaged
in a holy warfare against the powers of darkness, felt he had to put forth all
his energy in opposing the craft and subtleties of the Devil. No doubt some
heretics had such knowledge and dialectical skill as to put the examiner upon
his mettle, but in the majority of cases the duel of
wits was quite unequal, the accused, an illiterate man, too much scared to make
full use of such faculties as he possessed. At one time defending counsel were
allowed, but as inquisitors, such as Bernard Gui,
were apt to take the view that the defence of one suspect of heresy rendered
the advocate open to the charge of fautorship, such
assistance was hard to get, and the ruling of the Council of Albi (1254) that
advocates were not to be allowed was soon generally adopted.
If the interrogatory did not by itself
suffice to secure what the inquisitor was always aiming at—voluntary
confession—torture was employed. Technically foreign though it was to the
Canon Law, the use of torture came in with the study of Roman Law and the
prohibition of the ordeal. It was sanctioned by the Lateran Council of 1215 and definitely ordered by the great bull of Innocent IV
published in 1252, Ad extirpanda. At first it
was laid down that the actual infliction must be carried out by the civil
authority, but this salutary rule being found irksome, Alexander IV in 1256
permitted inquisitors and their officers to absolve one another for such canonical
irregularities. Another salutary rule was that torture could be administered to
a prisoner only once. This restraint also was found troublesome and it was easily evaded by another subterfuge. While torture could not be repeated, it was argued that it might be continued. This convenient verbal
distinction made it possible to torture a prisoner repeatedly without
contravening the letter of the law. A third awkward regulation was that a
confession was only valid when voluntary. The device adopted to overcome this
difficulty was to have the confession which had actually been wrung by pain confirmed three days after the torture had been applied, not in
the torture chamber, and officially to regard the confirmation as the true
confession. Clement V endeavoured to moderate the use of torture in a number of canons published among the Clementines (1312), which Bernard Gui complained of bitterly.
Strictly speaking, the Inquisition did
not punish; it only inflicted penances. Those meted out for a trivial case of suspicion might be light enough—the hearing of so many masses for example. But even for
the mere suspect the penalty was usually more serious than this. One of the
most frequent forms of penance was that of pilgrimage, either to a shrine in
the penitent’s own country in mild cases or to far
distant ones in a foreign country in more serious cases. Long absence from
home, loss of employment, and considerable hardship on the journey might be
involved. Flogging indicted with due ceremony publicly in church, often as an
interlude during the celebration of mass, was another penance. Another
infliction—one originally suggested by St Dominic—was the compulsory wearing of
crosses or some other emblem emblazoned in saffron on front and back. This
penance was one of the hardest to bear, as it exposed the sufferer to the jeers
and sometimes the violence of the mob, and its evasion was often attempted. At
length it became clear that some measure of protection for cross-wearers was
needful, and the Council of Beziers (1246) ordained that they were not to be
subjected to ridicule or driven away from their business. Pecuniary penalties
were often exacted. From the point of view of the penitent, the payment of a
fine was perhaps preferable to other forms of penance, but the temptation to
extortion is obvious, and in 1249 Innocent IV is found denouncing inquisitors
for their exactions. Confiscation of property was not a penalty
in itself, but the automatic outcome of a conviction of actual heresy;
nor was the Inquisition strictly responsible, for the secular authority stepped
in and sequestrated the property. But the Inquisition aggravated what had been
the rule of Roman Law, that the heretic’s possessions should pass to orthodox
sons, and made the confiscation absolute. The division of the proceeds varied
in different countries. Part went to the prince, part to the Church; but
sometimes a portion went to the heretic’s immediate lord, and sometimes, as
latterly in France, the Crown took all. Confiscations made heretichunting profitable to the State, and undoubtedly they formed a
strong inducement to the lay power to be zealous. Nevertheless, it is an error
to ascribe medieval persecutions to mere cupidity. Most heretics belonged to
the poorer classes. The most severe of all penances was imprisonment, often employed as the recompense for failure to carry out some
lighter penance, and on those who failed to surrender themselves during the
time of grace, but who made voluntary confession of their iniquity afterwards.
Imprisonment might be comparatively tolerable, or it might be very terrible.
The form termed murus largus allowed of the
prisoner’s leaving his cell at certain intervals and holding converse with
other prisoners similarly privileged and with friends from the outside world; murus strictus on the other hand meant rigorous
solitary confinement. The penalty of perpetual imprisonment in a dark and
noisome cell was probably more frightful even than
death at the stake.
Nevertheless, it is the spectacular
burnings that are associated most vividly in the popular mind with the
Inquisition. That being so, it is important to realise that in proportion to
the total number of inquisitorial sentences that of relaxation to the
secular arm was relatively very small. An analysis of the sentences of Bernard Gui extending over a period of seventeen years shows that
out of a total of 613 there were 307 of imprisonment, only 45 of relaxation. This penalty was reserved for only two types of offenders—the obdurate who
refused to recant and those who after reconciliation relapsed. The Church did
not desire the death of the heretic. The martyr does infinitely less damage to
his cause than the apostate. Thus relaxation to the
secular arm, with its inevitable consequence—the stake—was always a confession
of failure. The inquisitor was above all things a missionary, a
father-confessor, ready to welcome back truant sheep to the fold, only
requiring as the price of forgiveness a confession of sin and the performance
of penance as proof of sincere contrition.
In handing over the impenitent and the
relapsed to the secular arm, the Inquisition invariably made use of a formula
praying that the death or mutilation of the prisoner might be avoided.
This adjuration was invariably disregarded, and the Church knew that it always
would be. The formula freed the Church from the irregularity of being
responsible for the shedding of blood; but moral responsibility is not so
easily evaded. The secular authority certainly had seldom any qualms about
putting the heretic to death. Apart from the edict of Peter II of Aragon, there
are the more important constitutions of Frederick II. In the constitution
published at Catania for Lombardy in 1224 the punishment for heresy was
declared to be the stake or (at the discretion of the judge) loss of the
tongue; in the constitutions of Melfi, which applied
to Sicily, there is no mention of an alternative to the stake; in 1238 this
regulation was extended to the whole Empire. The use of the stake was customary
in France during the contemporary reign of St Louis and it was recognised as legal in the établissements of 1270. When heretics perished in the flames they perished in accordance with
civil, not canon, law. But it is clear that the Church
approved. Heresy was primarily a spiritual offence, investigated in a spiritual
court; the State’s appreciation of its enormity was due to clerical
exhortations, which likened heresy to treason. There is evidence that Frederick
II’s constitutions had ecclesiastical influence behind them, that of 1224 the
influence of Albert, Archbishop of Magdeburg, that of 1231 the influence of the
two Spanish Dominicans, Guala, Bishop of Brescia, and Raymond of Peñafort, confessor to Gregory IX and later general of the
Predicant Order. Both these men were exceedingly energetic in the campaign
against heresy. In 1229 the very important Council of Toulouse (using language
which occurs in Frederick’s constitutions and which
was repeated by the subsequent Council of Arles in 1234) ordered that all
heretics should be brought before the lay or the ecclesiastical authority ut animadversione debita puniantur, and added
significantly that those who through fear of death or other cause
returned to the faith should be imprisoned to prevent their contaminating
others. The phrase “merited penalty” clearly means death, and is used by
Gregory IX in his bull Excommunicamus, when, while mentioning every other kind of requital for various degrees of
guilt short of obduracy, he orders that the impenitent should be handed over to
the secular arm for punishment; it is also used by the Senator Anibaldi when introducing the imperial constitution into
Rome, which he ruled under the Pope’s authority and where in the same year
several obdurate heretics were executed. In 1245 Innocent IV included
Frederick’s constitutions verbatim in a bull Cum adversus haereticam pravitatem. In
a later bull of 1252, addressed to the secular rulers of Italy, Ad extirpanda de medio populi Chrintiani pravitatis zizania, the duty of doing their part
in uprooting heresy was forcibly enjoined upon those princes by Innocent, under
pain of their being accounted fautors of heretics in
case of non-compliance. All civil magistrates were commanded to co-operate with
the friars in bringing heretics to justice. With slight modifications this bull
was reissued by Alexander IV in 1259 and by Clement IV in 1265. Failure to
co-operate with the Church and to carry out its own legislation involved the
secular authority in the pain of excommunication. It was easy to justify the
Church’s attitude towards the death penalty, as Thomas Aquinas did, by the
argument of analogy —one of his theses is that the falsification of true
doctrine is worse than the issue of false coin, yet the coiner justly merits
death. It could also be defended from Scripture—did not Christ speak of the
branch that is gathered, cast into the fire, and burnt? So thoroughly did the
Church believe in burning as the right fate for the heretic, that when a man’s
heresy was discovered only after his death, it ordained that his bones should
be exhumed and solemnly burnt.
The Inquisition did not penetrate much
beyond the central and western parts of Europe. It found no home in the British
Isles or in Scandinavia and it made small headway east of the Adriatic, though
there was the original home of Catharism. The papal arm rarely stretched so far
with effect. Dominicans penetrated into those lands,
but with disappointing results, and there were massacres of the Black Friars
in Bosnia. After the coming of the Ottoman Turks, Cathari were converted to
Islam, never to Christianity. In Germany the tribunal was most vigorous in its
earliest days—those of Conrad of Marburg and Conrad Tors. Thereafter there came
a lull. It became more influential in the fourteenth century, but the papal
schism caused a great reduction in its authority. In Bohemia, though tkere was much activity against heretics, it appears to
have been that of the ordinary episcopal courts, not of the Inquisition. In
Italy the legislation of Frederick II and Gregory IX introduced an era of
persecution in which the Papacy shewed a marked tendency to translate
Ghibelline into heretic, finding the
Inquisition a very useful weapon in waging war against the rival faction. On
the other hand, certain Ghibellines, such as Ezzelin da Romano, deliberately
supported heretics in order to embarrass the Papacy.
The Church was able to enlist a considerable amount of lay enthusiasm in
support of the inquisitors, for example in the organisation of the Crocesegnati and the Compagnia della Fede which Peter Martyr, a
great hammer of heretics, raised in Florence. In southern Italy the Inquisition
was not very active. Charles of Anjou established it in Sicily, but when the
island after the Sicilian Vespers passed into the hands of the house of Aragon
persecution ceased.
Spain, most intimately associated in
later days with the Inquisition because of the activities of the tribunal as it
was organised in close touch with the monarchy by Ferdinand and Isabella, was
not inherently a specially intolerant country—the
reconquered Muslim population was well treated in the main—and the medieval
Inquisition does not play an important part in the country’s history. In the
reign of James I and during the powerful influence of
Raymond of Peñaforte the Inquisition flourished in
Aragon, and a thorough system of persecution was established by the decrees of
the Councils of Tarragona of 1232 and 1242. But it had fallen on evil days
before the end of the fourteenth century and was sadly lacking in funds, as its
great inquisitor, Nicholas Eymcric, laments. In
Castile and Portugal the tribunal was practically
unknown. It was in France that the Inquisition was most active and most
efficacious, not only in the south-east but also north of the Loire. But bitter
complaints of the cruelties and extortion of inquisitors reaching his ears,
Philip the Fair chose to adopt the cause of the complainants, especially during
his quarrel with Boniface VIII, when he took the drastic step of removing on
his own authority the two inquisitors most bitterly aspersed, and deprived
inquisitors generally of the power to make arbitrary arrests. When King and
Pope became reconciled in 1304, a compromise was arranged, whereby the aid of
the secular arm was unreservedly placed at the disposal of the friars, but it
was stipulated that royal officials were to visit their prisons to prevent
abuses. In doing its work so zealously and thoroughly, in bringing Languedoc
into complete subjection to the Papacy, the Inquisition bad also brought the
country into subjection to the King of France. It had, in so doing, helped the
aggrandisement of the French monarchy and indirectly enabled it to look on
inquisitors as little more than State officials, on the tribunal as but a
profitable piece of State machinery.
CHAPTER XXI.THE MENDICANT ORDERS
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